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NATURE OF THE CASE
Action for damages, injunctive relief, and attorney's
fees for alleged violation of respondent's lease.
DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT
The jury rendered a verdict in favor of respondent and
against appellant for damages in the amount of $65,000.
After the verdict and judgment thereon, the trial judge,
Honorable Bryant H. Croft, denied respondent's motions for
injunctive relief and for attorney's fees.

Denials of these

motions by the lower court are the subject of appellant's
appeal, No. 16601.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirrnance of said judgment of $65,000
in favor of respondent, or reversed for new trial should the
court hold the evidence insufficient.
In respondent's own appeal, No. 16601, presented by
separate brief, Penelko, Inc. seeks the reversal of the
lower court's orders denying appellant injunctive relief
and attorney's fees.

1
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MATERIAL FACTS OF THE CASE
Respondent controverts appellant's statement of
facts for the reason that appellant's purported facts are
so replete with misstatements and omissions that they give
an erroneous picture of the facts in this case.

Appel-

lant also fails to recognize that as the facts were found
by the jury in favor of respondent, respondent's evidence
must be accepted and all inferences from the evidence
drawn in favor of respondent.

Consequently, respondent,

pursuant to Rule 75(p), Subdivision (2), states the facts
as it finds them.
Respondent, Penelko, Inc. is a corporation.

One-

third of its stock is owned by E. Glen Koplin (Director
and President), and Carley P. Koplin (Director).

Another

third is owned by Roger Peterson (Director and Vice-President), and his wife, Lavon Peterson (Director).

The

remaining third is owned by Doyle Nelson (Director and
Secretary-Treasurer) , and his wife Charlene Nelson (Director).

(1708)
1.

The Lease Sued Upon

On March 25, 1972, the respondent and C. F. Malstrom
and Alvin E. Malstrom (the Malstroms were defendants
below} entered into a lease aareement, which is the subject
of the Complaint; a cO?Y of the lease agreement is attached
as Exhibit "A" to the Complaint and another copy was
2
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introduced in evidence as Exh. 1-P.
twenty years.

The lease term was for

Pagagraph 15 provides for successive renew-

als of five (5) years each, making a total term of forty
(40) years.
The lease covers a piece of land 120 feet deep and
70 feet wide, which fronts on 9400 South and on 700 East.
Paragraph 3 of the lease also allots respondent
parking space, namely a strip of land 70 feet in width and
234 feet in depth, running from the south side of the
east parcel proper to the north side of 9400 South Street.
This parking strip fronts on 9400 South and adjoins the
Perkins' Cake & Steak Restaurant on the east.

It is the

leased parking space upon which appellant landscaped,
built a roadway and erected a flagpole in defiance of
Penelko's lease.

The exhibits show this leased parking

space and "improvements" of appellant in part. (12-P, 14-P,
15-P, 19-P)
Paragraph 3 of respondent's lease also provides an
additional tract for parking

11

40 feet in width and 162

feet in depth" on the west side of the leased property
proper.
Paragraph 9 of the lease provides that the lessor
shall exert his best efforts to form an association of
lessees for the purpose of promoting the general welfare
of lessees within the shopping center.

Respondent exerted

3
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its best efforts, but no association of lessees was ever
formed.

( 176 6 , 1737 - 1738)

Paragraph 6 of the lease provides respondent may
maintain signs and particularly "one lighted sign" in
front of the leased premises (9400 South) but no nearer
to 9400 South than Albertson's sign.

Paragraph 6 also

provides that upon formation of a merchant's association,
signs should be replaced and erected "in conformance with
rules and regulations of such association".

As mentioned

above, no association was ever formed.
Paragraph 7 of respondent's lease contains restrictions on the lessors (Malstroms) in leases of property
adjoining respondent's leased property.
Respondent regards paragraph 7 of the lease most
relevant to this cause, it is set out in full below:
All parking facilities, lighting facilities and
open spaces upon the leased premises are to be
used in common with other occupants of property
of the lessor for the maintenance and development of a shopping center and no barriers shall
be constructed or permitted which will bar access
to such parking facilities and access roads by
tenants of other premises or their customers or
guests.
The lessor shall provide in leases of
adjoining property similar covenants and agreements so that the lessee shall have similar
unobstructed access to parking, lightincr and
other coI!linon facilities of adjoining tenants.
(our emphasis)
2.

Respondent's Construction of the Chantel Theatre,
Erection of Theater Sign, Installation of
Parking Lights

From 1972 (execution of respondent's lease) to 1973
respondent constructed the Chantel Theatre on the leased
4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

premises.

Substantially and physically, the owners of the

corporation constructed the theater.

Glen Koplin, Presi-

dent of respondent, is a mason contractor;

Roger Peterson,

Vice-President of respondent, is a drywall contractor and
plasterer; Doyle Nelson, Secretary-Treasurer of respondent,
is an electronics worker.

(1708)

In 1973, following construction of the Chantel Theatre,
respondent established entrance, parking, lighting, and
erected the theater sign.

The theater sign, is appropriately

called a marquee, in that it has lights showing the attraction at the theater each day.

The sign was approximately

8 feet by 12 feet on a pole 10 feet above the ground.

It had

letters on both sides of it, and was placed in an east-west
direction so that it could be seen from the traffic flow,
both east and west.

(1708 - 1714)

In 1973 approval of the theater construction, sign
placement and the lights was made by the Malstrorns (lessors),
by Sandy City, and by Albertson's.

Upon these approvals,

the Chantel Theatre opened for business in June, 1973.
(1715 -

1716)

3.

Appellant's Threat That There Were Ways of
Acquirina a Business Other Than Buyinq it

In or about January, 1975, Penelko's officers, E. Glen
Koplin, Carley Koplin, and Doyle Nelson had a meeting with
John Price.

At this meeting, Price told respondent's

officers that the Malstroms had now leased the property to
Price and there was no place for the theater and it would
5
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have to be purchased by Price or relocated.

It didn't look

like it could be relocated at all on that property.

Price

made an unacceptable offer and he told the respondent's
officers that there are other ways to get a business if we
want to.

"We can build around you", "box you in", "so

that people can't see that you are there".

(1738 - 1740,

1943 - 1944, 2030 - 2317)
Thereafter there was litigation by Malstroms to
attempt to evict respondent which ended in execution of an
addendum to the lease sued upon, dated July 1, 1977,
mentioned below.

Pagagraph 4 of the addendum provides that

both Malstroms as lessors are in full compliance with all
provisions of the lease sued upon.
4.

Leases and Contracts Subsequent to Opening of
Chantel Theatre

After respondent opened its Chantel Theatre in June,
1973, the parties entered into the following leases and
contracts.
a.

On March 25, 1975, Malstroms and Price Rentals,

Inc. entered into an "Offer to Lease", dated March 27,
1975, which covered the property on which the Perkins' Cake

& Steak Restaurant was located.
guaranteed by John Price.

The Offer was personally

(Exh. 8-P, 1789, 1890)

b. On April 4, 1977, Price Rentals, Inc. entered into
a contract with Jack L. Kerbs, Inc. for construction of
the Perkins' Cake & Steak Restaurant.

(Exh. 11-P)

6
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c.

On December 20, 1976, Price Rentals, Inc. leased

to Perkins' Cake & Steak Restaurant the property on which
the restaurant was located.

Price Rentals, Inc. agreed to

construct the restaurant and also agreed that it would be
built in accordance with plans and specifications provided
by Perkins' Cake & Steak Restaurant.

(Exh. 10-P, 1791 -

1792)
d.

On July 1, 1977, respondent and the Malstroms

executed the addendum to the lease sued upon as abovementioned.
e.

(Exhibit B to Complaint)
On December 1, 1977, Malstroms leased to Price

Rentals, Inc. the property on which respondent's theater
was located and also the property upon which the Perkins'
Cake & Steak Restaurant was constructed.

The agreement

provided that Price Rentals, Inc. took the property subject
to respondent's lease and in effect, sold Malstroms' lease
rights to Price Rentals, Inc.

(Exh. 7-P, 1789 - 1790)

John

Price guaranteed the performance of Price Rentals, Inc. on
the lease.
5.

Appellant's Violation of Respondent's Lease Over
Respondent's Protest and After Notice by Respondent of its Lease Rights

By reason of Malstrom's lease to appellant of the
property covering respondent's leased property of December 1,
1976,

(which was subject to respondent's lease and was in

effect a sale of same to Price Rentals, Inc.)

(Exh. 7-P)

7
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Price Rentals, Inc. became subject to all of the obligations of the lease sued upon by respondent, and it is so
stated in Exhibit 7-P.

Thereafter, appellant did the follow-

ing acts in willful violation of respondent's lease.
(Exhibit 1-P)
In the middle of summer of 1977, respondent's president, E. Glen Koplin, noticed some markings placed on
asphalt that the Chantel Theatre used in its parking.

He

asked the man in charge, Marvin Dobkins (Price Rentals, Inc.
employee) why he had marked Penelko's parking.

Dobkins

responded that he represented the Price industries that
were leasing the theater to Penelko.

Dobkins showed

Koplin a plan that left the Chantel Theatre with just a
fraction of its parking and was also advised that there
was going to be a driveway over the parking and there wasn't
going to be a theater sign there, that Price owned the
property and

was

going to redesign it.

Koplin responded

that Penelko, Inc. had a lease on the property "and you
can't do that".

Koplin also mentioned that the theater's

two lights didn't seem to be on the plans, and Dobkin
advised they will be removed also, but he would check into
it.
In August, 1977, respondent's Director, Carley Koplin,
and her attorney, Nolan Olsen, met with Jack Kerbs, Price
Rentals, Inc. contractor for construction of the Perkins'
R
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Cake and Steak Restaurant.

Kerbs was advised that construc-

tion of the restaurant was infringing on respondent's
parking rights as lessee of the property.

(1950 - 1951)

In the latter part of August, 1977, appellant cut off
the electricity to the theater sign so that the lights did
not show and also two of the three parking lights respondent
had installed.
darkness.

For two months the theater was in total

(2449 -

2450, 1968 - 1969)

The Perkins' Cake and Steak Restaurant was completed
in or about the first of November, 1977.

After the restau-

rant proper was constructed, appellant Price Rentals, Inc.
did the following additional wrongful acts in violation of
respondent's lease.
Jack Kerbs, Inc., employed by Price Rentals, Inc. to
construct the restaurant (Exh. 11-P) ran a 35 foot roadway
through the parking lot and re-striped the parking showing
no parking permitted on the west side of the restaurant.
Kerbs also build an island, landscaped, erected a
flagpole over the parking space and removed two of Penelko's
parking lights.

Price Rentals, Inc. also tore down Penelko,

Inc. 's Chantel Theatre marquee on November 4, 1977.

This

was ordered by Marvin Dobkins, Price Rentals, Inc. employee
who was directed by Price Rentals, Inc. Vice President, Rex
Frazier.

(1728 -

1733, 1801 - 1823, 2135 - 2145, Exh. 3-P)

The Chantel Theatre marquee was torn down in the presence of and over the verbal protests of respondent's
Directors, Carley Koplin and Lavona Peterson.

(1953 - 1959,
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9

Exhs. 45-P, 46-P, 47-P)
Construction of the restaurant complete with landscaping, tearing down Penelko's sign, and erection of the
restaurant sign, was completed on or about November 4, 197 7 ,
and the restaurant opened for business November 7, 1977.
( 144)
The construction of the Perkins' Cake and Steak Restaurant proper was also a willful violation of Penelko's
lease.
The Perkins' Cake and Steak Restaurant adjoined the
Penelko leased premises on the south.

Respondent's lease,

paragraph 7, provided that
all parking facilities . . . upon the leased premises are to be used in common with other occupants
of property of the lessors,
and that
The lessor shall provide in leases of adjoining
property similar covenants and agreements so that
the lessee shall have similar, unobstructed access
to parking, lighting and other common facilities
of adjoining tenants. (our emphasis)
Neither Malstrom's Offer to Lease (Exh 8-P),
Agreement between Malstroms and Price Rentals, Inc.

Lease
(Exh.

7-P) or Price Rentals, Inc. Lease to Perkins' Cake & Steak
Restaurant (Exh. 10-P) had any such or similar covenant.
Price Rentals' lease to the restaurant provided "that the
shopping center shall contain a minimum of 400 parking
spaces, .

" (paragraph 24, Exh. 10-P)

But the use of parking spaces of the shopping center
was contingent upon the formation of a merchants' association
10
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and the promulgations of rules based on agreements provided
for use of such common parkina.

No merchants' association

was ever formed.
The court will have noticed that Price Rentals, Inc. 's
lease with Perkins' Cake and Steak Restaurant providing for
construction of the restaurant was dated December 20, 1976,
which was about a year earlier than Malstroms lease to Price
Rentals, Inc. of the property on which the restaurant was
located (December 1, 1977).

(Exh. 10-P, 7-P) The only con-

tract Price Rentals, Inc. produced providing any right of
appellant to construct the restaurant was the "Offer to
Lease".

It can be inferred that appellant in the action did

not produce all writings it was requested to produce, for as
is mentioned above, John Price, President of Price Rentals,
Inc. was claiming ownership of Penelko lease as early as
January, 1975.

Even the "Offer to Lease" was dated March 25,

1977.
Further, appellant so constructed the Perkins' Cake
and Steak Restaurant that it did not and could not provide
parking for Chantel Theatre customers.
Perkins' Cake and Steak property on which the restaurant was built was approximately 73 feet by 155 feet.

The

restaurant itself substantially covered such property so that
the only parking provided was 4 to 5 to 7 spaces at the rear
(north) of the restaurant for restaurant employees.
1987, 2168, Exh. 69-P, 2038 -

2039)

(1730,

Appellant provided no

document showing their rights to any other parking spaces,
11
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although subpoenaed to do so.

(2212)

Sandy City, in its CUP

permit, required that the restaurant construct 24 parking
spaces, but it did not do so.
6.

(Exhs. 22-P, 24-P, 2167)

Mitigation of Damages.

Appellant, after tearing down the Chantel Theatre
marquee in an attempt to mitigate damages, installed a
portable roll-about sign.

This was totally useless.

The

children changed letters around, knocked it to the ground,
and people could not see it when they were driving by the
theater.

(1985 - 1987)

Regarding this sign, appellant's

expert witness, David C. Edwards, testified "I said I
wouldn't have it in front of my business.

I wouldn't take

the time to put it out there." (2438)
He also testified, "I would say that the portable
sign would deteriorate the theater."

(2439)

Later, Al Jackson, a representative of appellant, proposed a sign on the Chantel Theatre.

He showed director

Carley Koplin a proposed drawing of the proposed sign.

The

proposed sign would not have had much benefit becuase it
was too far from the road.

Respondent's director, Carley

Koplin did approve appellant putting up the sign, but so
that there was no question that it did not take the place
of the sign that was torn down, wrote on the approval:
Penelko, Inc. will accept this sign as an effort
of sorts to mitigate damages to the corporation.
It does not meet Penelko's specifications and not
to be accepted as a sole marquee.
Appellants did not install the proposed sign on the
top of the theater.

(Exh. 55-P, 1970 - 1974)
12
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Penelko has never refused any request of Price Rentals,
Inc. to install any sign in an attempt to mitigate damages.
(1974)
At about the time that Price Rentals, Inc. tore down
the Chantel Theatre marquee, respondent's directors, Carley
Koplin and LaVona Peterson asked Edward P. James, Planning
Director for Sandy City whether they could replace the Chantel
Theatre sign at another location.

He replied there was "no

way" they could have another sign and further that they (Sandy
City) deal only with the owners of the property, and in this
case, it was the Malstroms.

(1964, 2181 - 2184, 1874 - 1878,

1869 - 1870, 1976 - 1882)
7.

Respondent's Damages.

Before the construction of the Perkins' Cake and Steak
Restaurant and the landscaping and roadway over respondent's
leased parking spaces, respondent had at lease 50 parking
spaces.

Chantel Theatre patrons had no parking problems.

(2170 - 2171)
spaces left.

After the construction, there were some 24
(1725, 1966 - 1968)

After Perkins' Cake and Steak restaurant opened for
business on November 7, 1977, (when appellant had torn down
respondent's sign and disconnected two of its parking lights,
landscaped and built road) respondent's customers had little
or no parking space.

Perkins' Cake and Steak Restaurant,

having build no parking space of its own and constructed its
entrance adjacent to respondent's leased parking space, the
restaurant's patrons took over respondent's leased parking

13
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place.

Employees of respondent would park off the space in

the dirt to at least leave some place for patrons to park.
(2170 - 2171)

There was little or no parking available.

days all of it was gone.
be left.

Some

Some days 10 or more spaces would

On the road it would always look like the parking

was completely taken.

(1736)

The Chantel Theatre's evening

show commenced at 7:00 p.m. and the restaurant was open 24
hours a day.

During the evening shows, the parking was com-

pletely taken over.

(1735, 1966 - 1968)

Appellant's theater witness David K. Edwards (who
visited the theater on the last Saturday in April, 1979)
testified that he wouldn't have known there was a theater
there if he hadn't made a survey to find it, that he wouldn't
go into the theater if he was a customer because it didn't
look like a theater.

(2445 - 2446)

Before appellant's willful breach of respondent's
lease (as above mentioned) the revenue and net income of the
Chantel Theatre climbed steadily.

After said violations of

the lease, consummating in the opening of the Perkins' Cake
and Steak Restaurant November 7, 1977, the revenue and net
income plunged.
The testimony of respondent's C. P. A. John Gidney,
together with his exhibits show this.
Based on Exh. 40-P and 41-P (documents showing all
revenues and all expenses of the Chantel Theatre and including
income tax returns) Exh. 39-P, 42-P were received in evidence.
Pages 1, 2, and 3 of respondent's Exh. 39-P show a steady
14
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climb in revenue from the theater's operation in June, 1973
and the plunge in revenue after appellant's violation of
respondent's lease.

For example, that year's six-month

revenue for the year 1973 was $27,463.90, and for the year
1976 was $68,099.93.

(pages 1 and 2, Exh. 39-P)

After appellant's violation of respondent's lease in
November, 1977, the revenue for 1978 plunged to $27,776.10.
(See page 2 of Exh. 39-P)

The graph on page 3 of Exh. 39-P

graphically shows this rise and plunge of revenue.
Page 4 of Exh. 39-P shows the rise and fall of net
income for the years 1974 through 1978 which are 4 years of
operation.

This page of the exhibit shows a continual

increase of net income of the theater from 1974 through
1976.

Then after Price Rentals' violation of Penelko's

lease, it shows a sharp decline in net income for 1977
through 1978.
Exh. 39-P originally contained a page 5 (which was
made Exh. 43-P).

This page contained a mathematical projec-

tion of what the income would have been had the Chantel
Theatre's growth in profits continued on the lease which reflected a loss of net income for the remaining 35 years of
the lease of some $777,000.

However, the jury had the facts

and figures on this mathematical projection and consequently
they could draw inferences.

Thus, the jury could have

brought in a verdict of damages of some ten times the $65,000
verdict they did bring in.

(1904 - 1910)
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Exh. 42-P prepared by witness Gidney depicts by graph
basically the information contained in Exh. 39-P and graphically depicts the steady rise in income until the appellant's
violation of respondent's lease when the revenue plunged.
(See Gidney's testimony commencing on 1885)
Gidney further testified that his exhibits showing
what the net income could have been had it not been for the
sudden plunge in net income after appellant's violation of the
lease was substantially consistent with respondent's copies
of the United States tax return for the years 1973 through
1977.

(Exh. 44-P)

Gidney testified that his exhibits cor-

rectly reflected the tax returns, when he eliminated income
tax factors which did not reflect the actual net income from
the operation of the theater.

For example, the depreciation

of improvements on real property is fixed by cost and is not
actual market value.

(1938, 1934 and 2024)

Appellant's witness Duane Liddell, a C.P.A. and his exhibits collaberated Gidney's evidence in every respect.

It

showed, as did Gidney's evidence, that before appellant violated respondent's lease, there was a continual rise in
revenue which dramatically decreased after the violations.
(2423 - 2424, Exh. 94-D)
ARGUMENT
I.

Answering Appellant's Point I That the Judgment
Against Appellant Should be Reversed Because of
the Trial Court's Error in Denying Appellant's
Motions for a Directed Verdict.

Under this heading (pages 14 to 16) appellant attacks
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the jury's verdict
16

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Actually, the jury's verdict was woefully inadequate.
The evidence would have supported a verdict of over $700,000.
The factual basis for the jury's verdict is set forth
above in MATERIAL FACTS OF THE CASE and, particularly, Subsection 7 of same "Respondent's Damages". (page 13 supra)
Respecting the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the $65,000 verdict are the following facts.
Respondent's theater was not a new venture when appellant willfully and wrongfully violated respondent's lease in
1977.

The theater had been operating since 1973.

Consequently,

it had prior experience upon which to base a claim for loss
of future profits it would have made but for appellant's
tortious acts; namely, constructing improvements over respondent's leased parking place, tearing down respondent's theater
marquee, disconnecting two of respondent's parking lights,
and usurping respondent's parking by constructing the Perkins'
Cake and Steak Restaurant without any parking for its customers
so that it took over respondent's allotted parking after
November 7, 1977 when the restaurant opened for business.
These tortious breaches of respondent's lease were
calculated, deliberate, and were done with full knowledge of
respondent's lease.
Appellant's acts resulted in the decline of respondent's profits and created the uncertainty of what future
profits respondent would have made had it not been for these
acts in breach of respondent's lease.
The evidence shows that before appellant's breach of
respondent's lease, respondent's net income from the theater
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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climbed steadily.

That after said violations consummating in

the opening of the Perkins' Cake & Steak Restaurant on November 7, 1977, the revenue income plunged.

John Gidney's

testimony and his Exhibits 39-P and 42-P show this as stated
in "7.

Respondent's Damages" above.
As a convenience to the court, we attach hereto as an

appendix a copy of Exhibit 39-P.
By mathematical computation and/or inference, had this
upward climb of profits contineud until the 35 years remaining
of respondent's lease, the loss of profit would have amounted
to $777,000.
of Exh. 39-P.

(See Exhibt 32-P, which was originally page 5
The court did not allow this page in evidence

but it was merely a mathematical computation.)

Further, as

stated above, the evidence of appellant's witness, Duane
Lidden, CPA, corroberated Gidney's evidence in every respect.
The authorities appear uniform in holding that (where
as here) the party's business is not a new venture but has
prior experience upon which to base a claim for future
damages, damages for loss of future profits should be awarded
despite the fact that they cannot in the nature of them be
fixed with exact certainty.

And further, that the wrong-doer

(appellant herein) cannot complain as his wrongful acts
created the uncertainty.
Security Development Co. v. Fedco, Inc., 22 Utah 2d,
462 P2d 706 (1960), involved an action for lost profits for
violation of a lease, resulting in loss of floor space.

The

court pointed out that in Fedco plaintiff was engaged in a
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new business venture and had no prior experience upon which to
base a claim for loss of future profits.

But plaintiff had

claimed damages during the period it had occupied the premises,
and the court ruled that these damages were not to be denied
simply because they could not be ascertained with exactness,
stating:

"Damages are not to be denied because they cannot

be ascertained with exactness."
Regarding the prerogative of the jury to draw inferences from the evidence presented, the court quoted from
Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653, 66 S.Ct. 740, 744, 90
L.Ed. 916 (1945):
It is no answer to say that the jury's verdict
involved speculation and conjecture. Whenever
facts are in dispute or the evidence is such that
fair-minded men may draw different inferences, a
measure of speculation and conjecture is required
on the part of those whose duty it is to settle
the dispute by choosing what seems to them to be
the most reasonable inference. Only when there is
a complete absence of probative facts to support
the conclusion reached does a reversible error
appear. But where, as here, there is an evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict, the jury is
free to discard or disbelieve whatever facts are
inconsistent with its conclusion. And the appellate court's function is exhausted when that
evidentiary basis becomes apparent, it being
immaterial that the court might draw a contrary
inference or feel that another conclusion is more
reasonable.
In Freeway Park Bldg., Inc. v. Western States Wh. Sup.,

22 Utah 2d 266, 451 P2d 778 (1969), where plaintiff was wrongfully evicted from the premises) again the plaintiff had not
been in operation long enough to have a history of profit to
figure loss of future profits.

Nevertheless, regarding

defendant's contention that the loss of profits could not be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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fixed with exactness and, therefore, there was uncertainty in
the evidence, the court stated:
There is evidence to the effect that the
tenants had made a profit durinq the five
months immediately preceding the attachment
amounting to approximately $15,000. The
records were not complete, and a certified
public accountant doing the best he could with
what he had calculated the gross sales for the
five-month period to be $136,000 and the net
profit as stated above . . .
In this case concrete data was given in
evidence; and while the records were not sufficient to give the exact prior earnings, we think
they were sufficient to enable the jury to infer
the amount of damages, if any, which were occasioned by reason of the wrongful attachment and
eviction, and thus to give a just verdict in the
case. See McCormick on Damages, Hornbeck Series,
Sec. 229.
Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 237 U.S. 251,
90 L.Ed. 652 (1946) states the rule as follows:
Nevertheless, we held that the jury could return
a verdict for the plaintiffs, even though damages
could not be measured with the exactness which
would otherwise have been possible.
In such a
case, even where the defendant by his own wrong
has prevented a more precise computation, the
jury may not render a verdict based on speculation or guesswork. But the jury may make a just
and reasonable estimate of the damage based on
relevant data, and render its verdict accordingly.
In such circumstances "juries are allowed to act
on probable and inferential as well as upon
direct and positive proof" .
It would be an inducement to make wrongdoing so
effective and complete in every case as to preclude any recovery, by rendering the measure of
damages uncertain.
Failure to apply it would
mean that the more grievous the wrong done, the
less likelihood there would be of a recovery.
The most elementary conceptions of justice
and public policy require that the wrongdoer .
shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which his
own wrong has created.
20
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The constant tendency of the courts is to
find some way in which damages can be awarded
where a.w7ong has been done, and difficulty in
ascertaining the damages is not to be confused
with the riaht of recovery for a proven invasion
of the plaintiff's rights.
See also Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper
Co., 282 U.S. 555, 75 L.Ed. 544.(1931), in which it is stated
as follows:
Where the tort itself is of such a nature
as to preclude the ascertainment of the amount
of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny
all relief to the injured person, and thereby
relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend for
his acts. In such case, while the damages may
not be determined by mere speculation or guess,
it will be enough if the evidence show that the
extent of the damages is a matter of just and
reasonable inference, although the result be only
approximate. The wrongdoer is not entitled to
complain that they cannot be measured with the
exactness and precision that would be possible
if the case, which he alone is responsible for
making, were otherwise . . . As the supreme
court of Michigan has forcefully declared, the
risk of the uncertainty should be thrown upon
the wrongdoer instead of upon the injured party.
Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich. 542, 550-556.
Eastmen Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273
U.S. 359, 71 L.Ed. 684 (1927), (the classic decision), states
the rule as follows:
"Damages are not rendered uncertain because they
cannot be calculated with absolute exactness. It
is sufficient if a reasonable basis for computation
is afforded, although the result be only approximate." This, we think, was a correct statement
of the applicable rules of law. Furthermore, a
defendant whose wronqful conduct has rendered
difficult the ascertainment of the precise damages
suffered by the plaintiff, is not entit~ed to
complain that they cannot be measured with ~e
same exactness and precision as would otherwise
be possible. Hetzel v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 169
U.S. 26, 39, 42 L.Ed. 648, 562, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep.
255. And see Lincoln v. Orthwein, 57 c.c.A. 540,
120 Fed. 880, 886.
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See also Jacksonville Blow Pipe Co.

(5th Cir.), 264

F2d 717 (1959); Wyoming Wool Marketing Assoc. v. Woodruff,
372 P2d 174, 3 ALR3d 802 (1962); and Reed v. Williams,
445

s.w.
II.

(Ark.)

90 (1969).
Answering Appellant's Point II. That the Court
Erred in Application of the Law to the Facts of
the Present Case.

Respondent believes what it has said above completely
answers appellant's Point II.

Under this argument on pages

21 through 23, appellant contends that the court failed to
properly instruct the jury on proximate cause re damages.
Even had this been the case, the error would not have been
prejudicial.

For the evidence was sufficient to support a

finding that appellant's willful and wrongful acts did, without question, cause respondent's lost profits.
As is pointed out above, before appellant's violation of
respondent's lease, respondent had no parking problems.

But

after appellant had landscaped and built a roadway over
respondent's parking space and after appellant had torn down
the Penelko Theatre sign and disconnected two of its lights,
and after the Perkins' Cake & Steak Restaurant was opened on
November 7, 1977, there was little or no parking available
for Penelko's theater customers.
ing was gone.

Some days, all of the park-

Appellant's theater witness testified if he

hadn't made a survey to find a theater, he wouldn't have
found it because it didn't look like a theater, and if he were
a customer, he wouldn't go into it.

(See page 14 supra)

However, the court did properly instruct the jury re
proximate cause and dawages.

In Instruction No. 21, the court
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If you ~ind the issues in favor of plaintiff
a~d against the defendants, or either of them, it
will be ~our duty to award the plaintiff such
damage, if any, as you may find from a preponderance of the ev~de~ce will fairly ar.d adequately
compensate plaintiff for any injury, and the damages therefor, as defined in these instructions
which plaintiff has sustained as a consequence ~f
any wrongful conduct of defendants, or either of
them. ( 120 5)
Further, the jury was instructed,
Such damages must be certain both in their
nature and as to the cause from which they proceed.
They must be directly and necessarily
occasioned by the lessor's wrongful act and must
have been reasonably within the minds of the parties at the time of the lease. (Instruction 22,
1206)
The error in the court's instructions was against Penelko, Inc.

For examples:

In instruction No. 15 the court instructed the jury
that the plaintiff's rights under the lease to use parking
areas, install signs and lights were still subject to the
rights of the lessors, first the Malstroms and then Price
Rentals, Inc., to develop an integrated shopping center.
(1198)

But no integrated shopping center was ever authorized

under the lease and no merchants' association was ever formed.
(see paragraph 6 of respondent's lease)
In instruction No. 20 the court instructed the jury that
in determining whether any act done by defendant was wrongful,
the jury should consider whether such acts were reasonably
intended to further the purpose of developing an integrated
shopping center.

But as stated above, the very least parking

rights plaintiff had under paragraphs 3 and 7 of its lease
(whether or not a shopping center had been formed) was to use
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the parking in conunon with the adjoining tenant, Perkins

& Steak.

1

Cake

Price Rentals, Inc. by landscaping over the parking

place, building a roadway on it, striping it for no parking
and erecting a flagpole prevented such use by plaintiff.
Price Rentals contends on pages 21 and 22 of its brief
that much of testimony of witness John Brown was permitted to
go to the jury permitting it to speculate on the <larnage to
Penelko's leasehold.

Mr. Brown was an independent real estate appraiser
with outstanding qualifications.
leased property and theater.

He was familiar with the

He examined it many times, and

was an expert in appraising theaters.
2049, 2058)

(2040 - 2042, 2044 -

Mr. Brown's proposed testimony was to show the

value of Penelko's leasehold before Price Rentals' violation
of the lease and after the violation of the lease.
The court

refused

to

permit one iota of opinion testi-

mony of Mr. Brown on the value of Penelko's leasehold.
For examples:
The court sustained Price Rentals' objection as to the
best use of the property.

(2050)

It sustained Price Rentals' objection as to economic
rent.

( 2052, 2053)
The court sustained Price Rentals' objection as to the

value of the leasehold interest.

(2054)

It sustained Price Rentals' objection as to the present
worth of the lease prior to November 4, 1978.

(2066)
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It sustained Price Rentals' objection as to whether the
parking lots were empty the 10 or 12 times Brown visited the
premises.
The court sustained Price Rentals' objection of the value
of the lease.

(2079 - 2082)

The court stated it would not question Brown's qualifications.

(2098)

But the court ruled it was not willing to rule that
Brown's testimony presents a fair measure of damages and could
not see that Brown's testimony consisted of a proper measure
of damages.

(2099 - 2101)

These errors of the lower court on instructions and refusal to admit expert testimony were prejudicial errors.
But respondent does not seek the reversal for new trial
on these errors except should the court rule that the evidence
was not sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict of $65,000.
Respondent does not want the expense involved in a new trial.
III.

Answering Appellant's Point III. That the Court
Erred When it Refused to Permit the Introduction
of Evidence That was Relevant and ~.aterial to
Vital Defenses Raised by Appellant.

Appellant's arguments under Point III. appear to be that
respondent refused to let appellant erect theater signs that
would have mitigated respondent's damages.
That is not correct.

For as is pointed out above, resp-

ondent permitted appellant to erect any sign it desired.
Appellant did install a roll-about sign that was worse than
useless.

But appellant declined to install a sign on top of

the theater when Director Carley Koplin would not agree that it
Sponsored by thethe
S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Funding
for digitization
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Appellant's statement at page 23 of its brief of the
testimony of Bernard Reynolds, Sandy City Planner, that the
city would have permitted relocation of plaintiff's sign is
misleading to say the least.

Reynolds was not Sandy City

Planner at the time respondent's marquee was torn down.

He

did not know the regulations at that time, and his testimony
was not unequivocable.
Mr. Reynolds was not employed by Sandy City when the
C.U.P. permit was issued providing that Penelko, Inc. must
provide 24 parking spaces.

He testified that if the property

on which Price Rentals landscaped, built a roadway and erected
a flagpole were on separate parcels of property, then there
could be separate signs.

But that leases were not within the

ordinances and had no relevance; that the whole area was owned
by the Malstroms.

Further, that the restaurant sign had no

right to be installed where it was unless on a separate parcel.
That Price Rentals had no right to install the restaurant sign
unless the theater sign came down.

( 2161, 2162

f

2167

I

2321,

2322, 2362, 2327)
Penelko' s theater marquee was already erected on the par·
eel, therefore, Price Rentals, Inc. tore it down.
The planning director handling this matter at the time
was Edward P. James.

And as is pointed out above, respondent's

directors, Carley Koplin and Lavona Peterson approached James
on putting up another sign, an

c James

replied, "No way", and

that he only dealt with the owner of the property, which in
this case was the Malstroms.

(page 13 supra)
26
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Appellant's proposal to erect a double sign involved an
agreement with the Norge Village Cleaners.

The cleaners' pro-

perty was not owned or controlled by Penelko.

It was property

adjacent to appellant on its west boundary.
Price Rentals' contention on page 24 of its brief that
the court rejected evidence of its proposal to erect a double
sign with the cleaners is misleading to say the least.
On the morning Price Rentals tore down Penelko's theater
marquee, November 3, 1977, Penelko's director, Carley Koplin,
had a telephone conversation with Marv Dobkins speaking for
Price Rentals.

He proposed taking the Chantel Theatre sign

down and adding a dual sign with the cleaning company.

She

advised that she could not consent to it until she had a meeting with the corporation's other directors.

She went to the

site of the theater with director LaVona Peterson.

Price

Rentals, Inc. tore down the sign while they were there.

(1951 -

1959)
Appellant did not put up such sign, and after Perkins'
Cake & Steak opened its business and usurped respondent's
parking place it would hardly have mitigated damages.

Respond-

ent permitted appellant any sign it wanted, to mitigate damages.
But the only sign appellant erected was the useless "rollabout" sign.
On page 30 of its brief, Penelko argues that the court
erred in not permitting it to cross-examine director Carley
Koplin on the contents of Penelko's intermediate appeal prepared
by Penelko's attorney, William H. Henderson.

This argument is
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obviously without merit.

(See Petition in Supreme Court)

There is no such admission.
IV.

Answering Appellant's Point IV. That Appellant
is Entitled to a Reversal of the Judgment Because
of the Court's Prejudicial Statements Durino the
Trial.

The trial court was not guilty of misconduct, and appellant's accusation of same is frivolous.
On pages 34 and 35 of appellant's brief, appellant complains because the court, in overruling an objection of appellent' s counsel, stated that the lawsuit arises because of the
fact that the roadway landscaping was constructed on parking
area leased to the Penelko theater.

Paragraph 3 and 7 of

the lease provides, at the very least, that Penelko have the
right to use its leased parking places in common with adjoining lessees.

Thus, the very least Penelko had under this

lease was the right to use the space in common with Perkins'
Cake & Steak Restaurant.

Thus, a roadway and landscaping over

this leased space prevented its use in common by appellant,
and this, among other things, is what this lawsuit was about.
It can hardly be misconduct of the trial judge to tell a jury
what the lawsuit is about.
The other claim of misconduct of the trial judge was his
statement quoted on page 37 of appellant's brief that neither
Sandy City, John Price, or Price Rentals had any right to
allocate to the restaurant as its parking stalls any parking
space on the respondent's leased land and had no right to
authorize construction on respondent's leased parking space.
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This also was a correct statement of the law.

Obviously, John

Price, John Doe, Sandy City, or any one else had no right to
alter respondent's rights under its lease.
DATED: July

_jl__,

1980

Respectfully submitted,

MARK S. MINER
Newhouse Building, Suite 525
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 363-1449
WILLIAM H. HENDERSON
431 South Third East, #208
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
322-1615
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served two copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief by mailing the same, postage prepaid,
to the office of Snow, Christensen

&

Martineau, 700 Continental

Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, this
July, 1980.
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•
PE::tu:11, lNC.
SU!·C-L\RY OF SALES
(C,\Sll fl\S I~;)

JUNE 1973 THROIJGl!

Tick"t
Sales

Month and Year

1973
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

1979

Concession
Sales

Sc
~

1,12!;.:JO
3,310.25
3,633.00
2 '402. 50
3,470.00
3'1,1,3. 7 5
---.I-'. 3J r~. ]_~

_ _ 9'll,.

$ 19,719.00

$

7 '7i14. 90

~

3,0RR.00
3,516.50
2,5711.00
2,501.00
2,771.50
2' 966. so
3,188.SO
3,421.50
3,518.00
5,696.50

$

•,•,·

923.50

1,255.00
1,151.54
1,139.70
1,127.01
1,055.44
1,420.36
1,145.76
1,491.67
1,527.37
2,082.76
1,613.6(>
738.69

4,
4,:
4,"
5,·:
1,·
6,:
_2_,'

TOTAL 1974

$ 39,788.00

$ 15, 748. 96

$ 55,;

1975

$

1,359.77
1,866.85
l, 4 34. 4 s
1,312.07
1,332.25
1,490.99
1, 4 34. 79
2,131.13
1,532.17
1,590.66
1, 243. 1,3
631. 16

4,:
6,

TOTAL 1973
January
1974
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December

January
February
March
April

~!ARCH

$

$

Hay

s

3,00Ci.00
4 '7 2 7. so
2,817.00
2,733.50
3,115.50
3,732.00
4,103.50
5,625.00
3,940.00
3,837.50
3,013.50
1,856.00
42,507.00

401. :,3
1,118.23
1,291.38
1,001.85
1,595.66
1,381.66

$ i,

"·
<

'•·

4,

r,~

~

11,6~2.50

l

June
July
August
September
October
November
December

TOTAL 1975

$

$

$ 17,409.80
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4,
J,
J,
l,i

4,:.

4r
4,;,

5/
5,i
7,i
),•,

s,:.
'

..

~ I~.

J :·
~

s

------

Tick'-' t
Sales

Month and Year
1976
January
February
;1arch
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
Nove!:!ber
Dececber
TOTAL 1976
1977
January
February
March
April
nay
June
July
August
September
October
Novecber
December

$

$ 50,702.25
$

TOTAL 1977
January
February
March

3,654.00
2,253.50
3,5J7.00
2 ,Sl18. 25
4,010.00
2,%1.50
2,751.50
3,947.00
2,655.50
2,8(>9.50
2,295. 75
8116.50
34,630.00

Total
Sales

1,4811.48
1,205.59
2,026.54
1,587.50
826.24
1,941. 75
1,887.12
1,268.66
1,462.73
1,525.24
1,429.54
752.29

5,222.48
3,936.09
7,466.29
6,680.75
3,125.74
8,066.25
7,998.12
4,837.66
5,785.23
6,396.99
5,721.54
2,862.79

$ 17,397.68

68,099.93

1,232. 77
659.61
l,129.10
1,024.99
l,1;89.77
l,068.70
1,066.87
1,315.40
931.87
1,219.40
777.25
329.85

4,886.77
2,913.11
4,666.10
),873.24
5,499. 77
4,030.20
3,818.37
5,262.40
3,587.37
4,088.90
3 ,073.00
1,176.35

$ 12,245.58

$ 46,875.58

$

$

1978

$

1,520.00
1,1115. 50
1, QI, 7. 00
1,5110.00
2,31'.i.OO
1,732.00
1,937.!10
2,476.00
1,740.50
1,755.50
1,525.50
1,415.50

$

547.70
527.20
401. 7 5
6711.57
874.90
668.10
690.88
815.85
720. 30
570.40
496.05
368.90

TOTAL 1978

$ 20,419.50

$

7,356.60

$ 27,776.10

1979

$

4,332.00
2,362.50
1,421.50

$

1,600.77
959.70
616.35

$

April

Nay
June
July
August
Septel!lber
October
November
December

January
February
March

3 '738. 00
2' 730. 50
5,439. 75
5,09J.25
2,299.50
6,124.50
6'111. 00
3,569.00
4,322.50
4 ,871. 75
4,292.00
2,110.50

Concession
Sales

---

$
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2,067.70
1,942.70
1,448. 75
2,214.57
3,189.90
2,400.10
2,627.88
3,291.85
2,460.80
2,325.90
2,021.55
1,784.40

5,932.77
3,322.20
2,037.85

---~
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PENELKO, INC.
INCOME STATEMENT
(C,\SH IlASIS)
197~

1974

1976

1977

17, 1,o<J. 80
(2,978.51)

$ :.0,102.25
17,397.68
(2,835.97)

,.0 311,630.00
12,245.58
(1,918.46)

$ 20,419.
7,356 ..
(1,800.:

56,938.29

$ 65,263.96

$ 44,957.12

$ 25,975.:

$ 13,377.36
9' 350.11

$ 13,705.96
10' ]21,. 79

$ 21,544.42

$ 14,018.33
6,198.58

$

8,311. 78

$ 22,727.47

$ 29,030.75

s

29,856.20

$ 20,216. 91

$ 13!002.:

$ 30,592.58

s

27,907.54

$ 35,407. 76

$ 24,740.21

$ 12,972.S

2,!121.811
1,760.20
2,780.00
1,392.33
439.90
30. '.i 7
281.00
10.00
2,216.11
33.31

$

2 ,671. 8L
2,178.C>O
2,160.00
1,283.32
755.80
6.95
675.00

$ 39,788.00
l'.i,7!13.96
(2,216.91)

$

TOTAL SALES

$ 53,320.05

s

~ncessions

Costs

TOTAL COST OF SALES

-

1.~.~07.00

1978

OF SALES

~

cioss

-

1975

I>IJ.ES
1icket Sales
concession Sales
Less Sales Tax

(l)S'l

- 1978

INCOME

OPERATING EXPENSES
"Advertising
Utilities
Rent
Insurance
hpairs & ~aintenance
Office Supplies
Legal & Accounting
Contributions
Property Taxes
TJxes & Licenses
TOTAL ORDINARY
OPERATING EXPENSES*

CASH AVAILABLE
FOR DEBTS**

$

$

2,253.48
3511. 89

2 ,98l. 34
2,438.07

$

8, 728.(
4,274.:

1,508.1
2,842.7 i
2. 886. 8 i

696. 78
700.55
15.31
205.00

2. 350. l'•
2,787.41
5,369.76
1,837.88
120. 78
17.66
205.00

2,537.52
397.85

2. 531. 02
453.85

9,972.42

$ 15, 723.50

$

8,914.1

9,016.71

$

4,058.7·

$ 11,365.76

$ 12,J4l1.85

s

$ 19,226.81_

$ 15,562.69

$ 25,1.35.34

$

$

1, :::·2 ~
133.1
185.0

---

---

35.0

~epreciation is not included, as all cash outlay for building and equipment was in 1973.
-- ••All loans are scheduled,for 1980 payoff - then <Jvailaole cash would go to stockholders.
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